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Abstract 
As William Sullivan walked to his car to begin the commute home after a long day at work, he considered 
the different options before him. As the CEO of the Texmark Real Estate Company (TexREC), Sullivan was 
concerned about the future of the company he had been leading for four years now. During this time, 
TexREC had enjoyed considerable success, nearly doubling the value of assets under management to 
$7.5 billion; however, the rapid growth also meant new challenges for the company. Sullivan was focused 
on finding new lines of business and untapped markets with the potential for high risk-adjusted returns, 
including potential expansion overseas if the right opportunity presented itself. Sullivan innately 
understood that finding the right talent to lead such initiatives was a crucial first step. 
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Introduction
As William Sullivan walked to his car to begin the commute home after a long day at work, he considered the 
different options before him. As the CEO of the Texmark Real Estate Company (TexREC), Sullivan was concerned 
about the future of the company he had been leading for four years now. During this time, TexREC had enjoyed 
considerable success, nearly doubling the value of assets under management to $7.5 billion; however, the rapid 
growth also meant new challenges for the company. Sullivan was focused on finding new lines of business and 
untapped markets with the potential for high risk-adjusted returns, including potential expansion overseas if the 
right opportunity presented itself. Sullivan innately understood that finding the right talent to lead such initiatives 
was a crucial first step.
TexREC in the past couple of years had aggressively ramped 
up its hiring efforts to find qualified professionals that suited 
the company’s culture. On-campus recruiting had grown 
significantly in order to locate entry-level financial analysts, 
and a rotational program for new hires had also recently 
been started to get them up to speed more quickly. Despite 
these programs, the human resources team at TexREC still 
often struggled to fill each opening with capable individuals. 
Part of the difficulty owed to the fact that TexREC was located 
in San Antonio, where the pool of real estate professionals 
was relatively small as compared to other major cities. Even 
for the needs of back-of-the-house operations, TexREC had 
been forced to open a satellite office in Dallas to tap into the 
market of experienced real estate accountants.
Similarly, Sullivan recognized that TexREC would soon 
have to address the space issues it currently faced at its 
headquarters in suburban San Antonio. Located across 
the highway from its financial services company (FinCo), 
TexREC’s home office was nearing its capacity because of 
the large number of recent hires. Continued growth meant 
that new space would soon be necessary, and Sullivan had 
already identified three different options. As Sullivan sped 
down the interstate towards his home at the edge of Texas 
Hill Country, he understood that the upcoming decision on 
TexREC’s new headquarters would have a dramatic impact 
on the company’s future, especially its capacity to attract 
sorely needed expertise.
TexREC operates as a wholly-owned subsidiary of its parent 
financial services company (FinCo). Despite being located 
in a separate building across the highway from FinCo’s 
main corporate campus, TexREC shares FinCo’s core 
mission, which is to provide affordable financial services to 
U.S. military veterans and their families. As such, TexREC’s 
ultimate goal is to generate profits that could be passed 
through to FinCo and then be used to supplement the 
broader business. Many of TexREC’s employees are also
veterans or have family members that have served in the 
military.
Since becoming CEO, Sullivan has also pushed for TexREC 
to concentrate more heavily on sustainable enterprises, 
and he believed the potential relocation could imprint this 
mindset in the company culture if he could place TexREC 
in a cutting-edge office building. This initiative aligned with 
Sullivan’s personal values and his vision for making TexREC 
a more socially responsible investor. He also believed that it 
would benefit the bottom line, despite larger upfront capital 
commitments. By lowering operating costs and attracting 
environmentally minded tenants, Sullivan was confident 
that his vision could be achieved.
1. COMPANY BACKGROUND
Originally tasked with managing FinCo’s long-term real 
estate investments, TexREC in recent years had expanded 
its business line to include managing and advising third- 
party investors. Although all of TexREC’s profits are 
passed along to its parent organization, today only about 
a third of the capital it invests actually comes from FinCo. 
In this sense, TexREC could perhaps be most accurately 
understood as a mid-sized private equity group. The rapid 
growth and consistent above-market returns have earned 
TexREC a great deal of respect within the institutional real 
estate community.
TexREC counts nearly 150 employees, all of whom are 
based in the San Antonio headquarters except for a handful 
of acquisition representatives spread across the country in 
gateway markets. Although the accounting team represents 
the largest division within TexREC, managing taxes and 
investments for increasingly complicated deal structures, the 
core of the business centers on the roughly 40 professionals 
that actively manage real estate investment decisions. 
Many of the real estate professionals have worked at 
TexREC most, if not, all of their careers, constituting an old
guard that has enjoyed considerable success but is quickly 
approaching retirement. Many members of the real estate 
team also graduated from universities in Texas, although 
it has become more diverse with some of the recent hires.
2. SULLIVAN’S BACKGROUND
Sullivan joined TexREC six years ago, originally in the 
capacity of COO, after being recruited for several months 
by then CEO Michelle Parker. Sullivan and Parker had 
previously built a close working relationship when Sullivan 
served as President and CEO of a smaller fund based in 
Houston. Sullivan feels his background and expertise give 
him a three- to five-year mandate as CEO, at which point a 
successor would be necessary to oversee the next phase 
of the company’s growth. As a career-long real estate 
professional, Sullivan is emotionally invested in the decision 
about TexREC’s future headquarters and sees it as a clear 
piece of his professional legacy at the firm.
In total, Sullivan brought 25 years of experience in the real 
estate industry to the table, including several years working 
as an investment sales broker and in development. This 
varied real estate experience has served Sullivan well since 
becoming CEO four years ago, allowing him greater insights 
into the various interrelated aspects of each investment 
opportunity as well as familiarity with the San Antonio 
market. This background also has led Sullivan to develop 
an appreciation for the importance of the built environment, 
especially in the work place, and has given him confidence 
in his ability to make the right decision about the company’s 
future location.
3. THE OPTIONS
A deliberate decision maker, at the onset of the process 
Sullivan had conducted preliminary research on a wide range 
of alternatives. At one point, he had even considered more 
dramatic changes, such as relocating the entire company to 
Dallas, where the real estate market was more established 
on an institutional level. More recently, Sullivan focused on 
more pragmatic options that would keep TexREC in San 
Antonio and close to FinCo. These possibilities included 
(i) minor renovations to the current Babcock building, (ii) 
relocating to a TexREC property in the outer suburbs, or (iii) 
leasing or developing space in downtown San Antonio. With 
each option, however, the goal was the same—to position 
TexREC for continued future success.
A. Stay at The Babcock
Perhaps the simplest route before Sullivan would be to 
stay put at TexREC’s current location in the Babcock area
of suburban San Antonio. TexREC had developed the 
Class-B mid-rise building about thirty years earlier and 
occupied three of the floors while leasing out most of the 
remaining space to smaller professional tenants. Although 
the design and mechanical systems of the building had 
been considered modern and up-to-date when it was first 
completed, the Babcock building had now become an 
archetypal 1980’s suburban office building. The Babcock’s 
lobby was outdated with marble cladding, dating to the time 
of construction. A large atrium ran through its entire height, 
substantially reducing usable space while impacting energy 
efficiency by increasing heating and cooling costs. Many 
employees disliked the atrium, and Sullivan described the 
experience as walking through a tunnel, criticizing it for 
being disproportionately large as compared to the size 
of the building. The Babcock also lacked amenities of a 
modern workspace, with only a fitness center that had been 
tucked into a corner of the parking garage.
At the same time, remaining at the Babcock would provide 
several practical benefits to TexREC. Staying put would 
be the most cost-efficient route because TexREC already 
owned the premises, and having control over the leases 
allowed it space for future expansion. TexREC currently 
occupies 80,000 sq. ft. of the 140,000 sq. ft. net rentable 
area in the Babcock; the other smaller tenants occupy close 
to 40,000 sq. ft., while the remaining space is currently 
vacant due to lease rollover. TexREC’s proximity to FinCo 
also allows for more frequent and meaningful interaction 
between management of the two companies. TexREC had
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also recently fitted out some of its spaces with modular 
furniture that both increased the density of workers and lent 
the interior a more contemporary look. However, its drab 
appearance was still apparent and Sullivan worried that 
such an approach might not be sufficient to alter TexREC’s 
appeal to younger workers, who typically preferred a much 
more open environment.
To address these issues, Sullivan believed that a complete 
overhaul of the Babcock was necessary, which would 
require a significant amount of capital. Sullivan had held 
initial discussions with structural and design consultants 
that TexREC had partnered with in the past, which revealed 
a budget of $11.2 million ($80 per sq. ft.). The consultants 
planned to cut down the height of the atrium by filling in the 
open space with expanded floorplates and revamping the 
lobby with contemporary finishes. They also recommended 
creating more transparency in the work areas, by replacing 
some of the interior walls with floor-to-ceiling glass and 
shifting the executive offices on the perimeter to a more 
central location, thus allowing more natural light into the 
workspace.
Sullivan believed these changes were essential and would 
probably reposition Babcock as a Class-A competitor 
in the market. The renovation of Babcock, however, 
would negatively affect employees and tenants during an 
estimated fourteen months of renovation. Sullivan’s team 
estimated these inconveniences would cost TexREC 
$500,000 in lost productivity and another $150,000 in the 
form of lease buyouts from in place-tenants who would 
have to relocate. Despite these costs, staying at Babcock 
remained the cheapest of the three options, with all-in-costs 
estimated to be $11.85 million (Exhibit 1).
B. Relocate to Shavano
TexREC's second option involved relocation to a building it 
already owned in the Shavano area at the northern edge of 
San Antonio. Developed several years ago as an income- 
producing property, Shavano represented a moderately 
affordable option because its work spaces would not require 
any substantial modernization. The Shavano building for 
several years has been occupied by a regional bank, which 
has used it as its corporate headquarters but is expected to 
relocate once the lease expires in two years. The bank has 
not provided formal notice of its intentions however, and 
in the end may decide to stay put, complicating Sullivan’s 
position.
One of the major upsides of the Shavano building in Sullivan’s 
eyes was that it would provide employees easy access to 
the amenities offered at TexREC’s resort just around the 
corner. TexREC had developed the resort several years 
earlier, and it was now considered a premier destination in 
the central Texas area, with an Arnold Palmer golf course, 
recently completed spa, and fine dining. The location would 
also allow TexREC to more easily host investors and clients, 
showcasing the firm’s hospitality expertise, and shorten 
commutes for many senior employees, who mostly lived in 
the outer suburbs.
At the same time, Sullivan believed these locational 
amenities would also prove enticing for other potential 
tenants, and taking over the Shavano building for TexREC’s 
use would eliminate the possibility of earning potentially 
premium rents, which the parent company FinCo viewed 
as a major downside. Yet Sullivan was confident that he 
could convince FinCo, and had asked his team to analyze 
the necessary upgrades and provide a cost estimate for the 
relocation.
His team estimated an overall NPV of $15.42 million 
(Exhibit 1), which included minor upgrades to the 220,000 
sq. ft. Class-A building, relocation costs, rent loss due to 
non-renewal of the lease, and additional rental income from 
leasing the previously occupied Babcock building. The 
team also recommended that TexREC occupy the 140,000 
sq. ft. space required, and lease out the remaining space.
C. Ground-up Development in Downtown
The third and final option under Sullivan’s consideration 
was potentially the most complicated—participate in the 
development of a new Class-A building in downtown San 
Antonio. Sullivan’s contact at a local brokerage firm had 
already identified a promising 4-acre site not far from the 
Pearl District, which is San Antonio’s trendiest neighborhood
Google, 2i
with some of the best restaurants and bars. The area also 
boasted close proximity to the famed River Walk and cultural 
institutions such as the Culinary Institute of America and 
art museums. Sullivan recognized these amenities would 
exert a strong pull on younger workers. Perhaps even more 
significantly, Sullivan knew that development would allow 
for the use of sustainable features not available in older 
buildings, such as the Babcock and Shavano, and that the 
Pearl District also featured easy access to San Antonio’s 
admittedly limited public transit system.
Sullivan planned to bring in development partners to 
reduce TexREC’s capital commitment and risk, and initial 
discussions with potential partners suggested a deal could 
probably be reached on favorable terms. Sullivan judged 
that TexREC could obtain a 10-percent rental discount 
by pre-leasing 140,000 sq. ft. of the development before 
completion. Sullivan also hoped to secure a sale-leaseback 
clause that would grant TexREC the option of selling its equity 
stake to its partners three years after project completion. 
Sullivan was also considering the purchase of naming 
rights to the building, estimated to cost an additional $2.0 
million, which he believed would provide an opportunity to 
reposition TexREC and announce it as a major player in the 
real estate industry. Sullivan’s analysts projected the NPV 
for this option at $32.9 million, substantially higher than the 
other two options, but more speculative.
One aspect of downtown development that worried 
Sullivan was that it would probably require a considerable 
commitment of his time to oversee the project and ensure 
that costs did not balloon out of control. Sullivan looked 
forward to such a challenge, similar to those he had 
previously confronted as a developer, but also realized 
his time might be better spent focusing on TexREC’s core 
business. Development of a new property downtown could 
also take several years to complete given the possibility of 
delays in obtaining approvals, and TexREC could outgrow 
its current location before then.
4. SAN ANTONIO MARKET CONSIDERATIONS
As Sullivan continued to mull over the three potential 
locations, he also considered the dynamics of the broader 
economy and the local office market. On a national level, 
interest rates remained at near-historic lows despite 
steady economic expansion in the several years since 
the Great Recession. The low rates meant TexREC could 
obtain capital at a relatively low cost and invest it in the 
modernization of one of the existing buildings or the 
acquisition of a new location. But market conditions also
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meant robust competition for real assets, especially in 
second-tier markets such as San Antonio with high upside, 
and steadily increasing construction costs.
Closer to home, the surrounding central Texas region for 
several years had benefited from healthy economic activity. 
Nearby Austin, in particular, has experienced tremendous 
growth in a range of industries, particularly in the technology 
and creative sectors. More recently, this momentum 
had started carrying over to San Antonio. The relative 
affordability of the area, both in terms of tax rates and the 
low cost of real estate, had caused many companies to 
relocate from major urban areas on both coasts. The result 
of this trend was increased job creation in the area. It also 
meant leasing a new location could be more expensive for 
TexREC, but that it could also generate substantial cash 
flow off the Babcock and Shavano, should it not occupy 
these buildings.
A. Northwest
Both the Babcock and Shavano buildings are located in 
the northwest San Antonio submarket, and Sullivan had 
recently tasked one of his analysts to pull market reports 
for the area. The region dominated San Antonio in terms
of office demand and new construction and had done 
so for a number of years. Through the first half of 2016, 
over 556,000 sq. ft. of office space had been absorbed in 
the submarket, representing over six percent of existing 
inventory. With another 785,000 sq. ft. of development in 
the pipeline, Sullivan was concerned that new competition 
could complicate efforts to lease up the Babcock and 
Shavano buildings.
The northwest submarket is home to some of San Antonio’s 
largest employers and a diverse array of residential 
neighborhoods. Large retail centers and intermittent 
mid- and high-rise office buildings line the sides of major 
highways that crisscross the area, such as 1-10 and 
Highway 410. Home to the main campus of the University of 
Texas at San Antonio, northwest San Antonio also hosts the 
region’s largest cluster of hospitals and medical services 
providers. Much of the housing in the area was comprised 
of older single-family homes in low- and middle-class 
neighborhoods. Recent development occurred primarily 
at the edge of the city as it steadily expanded towards 
Texas Hill Country in the form of new luxury single-family 
residences.
B. Downtown
In contrast to the northwest submarket, the reports on 
Sullivan’s desk clearly indicated a less vibrant—but 
improving—office market in the downtown area. Most of 
San Antonio’s major landmarks, such as the historic Alamo 
and the Tower of the Americas, were located downtown, 
which was easily accessible because of the numerous 
highways that intersected there. Vacancy rates hovered 
around 30 percent because of two million sq. ft. of new 
construction that had arrived on the market in the past two 
years. Absorption had not kept up with the new inventory, 
providing tenants with a range of choices and leverage 
in negotiations, which had pushed rental rates down and 
perhaps provided Sullivan's team with an opportunity to 
secure an affordable long-term lease.
FinCo had originally been headquartered downtown, but as 
one of the city’s largest private employers its decision to 
decamp to the suburbs in the early 1970’s helped contribute 
to a broader exodus of jobs and residents that had caused 
the heart of San Antonio to languish for decades. In recent 
years, city officials had worked to reverse the trend, which 
had resulted in the development of a few multifamily 
buildings and plans by a regional bank to build and occupy 
San Antonio’s first new high-rise office building in several 
years. Once completed, the tower would bring 2,500 well-
paid employees to downtown every day, which market 
watchers expected would energize the area and create 
momentum for further improvements.
Sullivan sympathized with the efforts to promote San 
Antonio’s urban core and wondered whether TexREC 
could contribute to them. Investment in a new downtown 
office would fit in with his goals of a socially responsible 
investment, by demonstrating the firm’s commitment to the 
local community. At the same time, Sullivan worried that a 
move downtown would entail unnecessary risk given that 
despite the city’s efforts, a vibrant urban core was by no 
means a foregone conclusion. On a more practical level, 
a downtown location would also place TexREC farther 
away from the local airport. The nature of the business 
required Sullivan and other managers to frequently travel 
to investigate potential investments, which was already 
complicated by the relatively limited number of direct flights 
available from San Antonio.
5. THE IMPENDING DECISION
Sullivan continued to ponder all of these issues as he pulled 
into the driveway of his suburban home. He recognized the 
importance of the impending decision on TexREC’s future 
and felt the pressure of it. He also understood that a choice 
would have to be made quickly in order to start the long 
process of obtaining the necessary approval from FinCo 
and preparing TexREC employees for the move; already 
rumors had started circulating about a potential move, 
causing some angst amongst employees. As Sullivan 
settled in for an evening at home, he committed to making a 
final decision in time to present it to his senior management 
team at next week’s meeting and get them started on the 
project.
6. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1. Which option best positions TexREC for the future? What 
are the pros and cons of each option?
2. Is the NPV analysis the right approach or do the 
qualitative aspects outweigh financial concerns?
3. Does TexREC really need to invest such a large amount 
of capital in their own office?
4. How should Sullivan convince the parent company 
FinCo?
5. If Sullivan chooses to stay at the Babcock, is it worth 
upgrading to Class A? Are the design changes justifiable 
or is there scope for value engineering?
6. If Sullivan chooses to relocate downtown, should he opt 
for sale leaseback?
Option 1: Renovate and stay in The Babcock building
a) Cost for renovation $80 per sq. ft. rentable area = 
140,000 x 80 to upgrade to Class A:
b) Relocation strategy: Renovation will only partially 
impact employees, however a $0.5 million relocation 
costs are anticipated for the temporary adjustments
c) Lease termination of smaller tenants: $150,000 to 
terminate the remaining leases
Anticipated NPV - Option 1
Option 2: Move to Shavano
a) Renovation costs @ $30 per sq. ft. net rentable area 
= $30 x 220,000
b) Effective rent loss/ gain annually = $822,000 (NPV 
@10% discount rate):
i) Rent Loss annually at Shavano = $140,000 x $23 
(average rent) [Remaining 80,000 sq. ft. will be 
leased out, the bank is willing to continue having a 
smaller office in the Shavano location]: $3,220,000
ii) Rent Gain annually at the Colonnade = $120,000 
x $20 = (considering current 86% occupancy): 
$2,400,000
c) Relocation costs: __________________________













i) Land contribution: $3.2 MM
ii) Construction @ $350 per sq. ft. = $49 MM
- $24,000,000
b) Effective rent loss/gain annually = -2,400,000 (NPV 
@10% discount rate):





d) RealCo branding/ naming for the building:
$32,900,000
Anticipated NPV - Option 3
